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This paper deals with macroeconomic coordination and its stabilization 
within a new Keynesian framework. The dynamic treatment of a two-
country model is made by simulation, using the linear quadratic algorithm. 
We compare the optimal monetary policy rule for three types of equilibria: 
macroeconomic coordination, Nash and Stackelberg, using parameters that 
reflect the relative size and degree of openness of the economies. Under the 
strict inflation target, we obtain higher output and inflation volatilities due 
to each economy’s reaction to the other country’s policy. The only 
exception is the case of optimal macroeconomic coordination rule. This 
dynamic model finds that macroeconomic coordination policy is better than 
non-coordination rules, supporting the traditional result found in static 
models. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays the formation of big economic blocks aiming at macroeconomic stabilization 
is becoming even more important, as one can note in Eurozone. Monetary policy is 
coordinated by just one Central Bank. 
The literature on macro coordination is considerable and started with the paper of 
Hamada (1976) and followed by Canzoneri & Gray (1985), Rogoff (1985), Kehoe 
(1989), and Canzoneri & Henderson (1991). One of the first papers about economic 
coordination among countries was by Robinson (1937). It involves a trade game among 
countries and the strategies and retaliations among partners in response to adverse 
situations. The main policy instruments are: depreciation of the exchange rate, wage 
reduction, exports subsidies and tariffs retaliations. This started an extensive research 
agenda focusing on trade policy cooperation among nations. 
Hamada (1976, 1985), using a box called the Hamada diagram, analyzed the monetary 
policy and exchange regimes, where the potential gains from macro coordination 
became more visible. Using the diagram, it was possible to show that Nash and 
Stackelberg equilibria were inferior solutions than coordination (which was located on 
the Pareto contract curve). 
Along the same line of showing that cooperation was superior, there is the Canzoneri & 
Gray (1985) paper. They analyzed the result of the same exogenous shock (for example 
an oil shock) on two blocks (in the case, the US and the rest of the world (ROW)). The 
analysis involved three types of externalities of the macro policy decision: i) externality 
with a negative symmetry (begger-thy-neighbor effect), where an expansionary policy 
in one country exports unemployment to the other; ii) externality with a positive effect 
(locomotive effect), where an expansionary policy in one country raises the GDP in the 
other; iii) externality with asymmetry, where the expansion in the US increases the 
product in ROW, but the expansion in ROW decreases the product in the US. They 
clearly pointed out that for regimes with positive or negative externalities there is room 
for coordination, giving superior results than the Nash or Stackelberg equilibria. But for 
the case of the asymmetrical externality, we do not get a clear result. 
Hamada (1976), Canzoneri & Grey (1985) and Walsh (1998) reach similar conclusions 
with different model. These models emphasize that coordination is desirable from an 
economic point of view. The major drawbacks of the mentioned models are: they are   5
static and the policy instruments to control are not clearly defined. All the policy 
decisions are taken at the same time and do not consider the delay effect of policy 
transmission. Understanding the macro coordination becomes more difficult when the 
policy decisions are not synchronized and when they are gradual. 
Rogoff (1985), using a monetary model, shows that a cooperative solution may be 
inferior to the non-cooperation, when the authorities do not take into account the 
reaction of the private sector. When the authorities for both countries try to boost the 
employment level, the private sector may become afraid of exchange rate depreciation 
and may adjust the wage and price level, increasing inflation. Rogoff claims that 
coordination involves credibility issues about the commitment of the authorities to 
fighting inflation. 
Kehoe (1989) rejected Rogoff (1985)’s point of view presenting a counter example 
where a government can maximize the welfare of the economy bringing about better 
results with macro-coordination than with Nash equilibrium. When there is a common 
strategy by the private agents and the government, these models raise questions about 
credibility and intertemporal inconsistency. 
All the quoted papers are two-country models. When more than two countries are 
involved the following cases are presented: i) all the countries work in coordination; ii) 
there is no coordination among them and iii) only a sub-set of those countries is willing 
to coordinate their policy. Partial coordination is only sustainable when no inside 
country (insiders) or nor outside country (outsiders) is willing to change the status quo. 
These questions of insiders and outsiders and others related to incentives (free-riding) 
are addressed by Espinosa-Vega & Yip (1994). 
In the 90’s, there are some papers considering how monetary policy should be 
conducted. Among them the inflation-targeting approach is the major theoretical and 
practical reference as a monetary rule and this framework has been adopted in many 
countries. The inflation-targeting framework allows us to treat the interaction among the 
major variables in a simple manner than the big econometric models. 
The present paper uses the inflation-targeting framework in a two-country model 
allowing us to consider macroeconomic stabilization and coordination between two 
nations. The inflation-targeting model is an extension of Ball (1998). The parameters 
are set in a way to characterize the difference in size and degree of openness of the two 
representative countries.    6
Three optimal monetary rules used in the paper are: a) macroeconomic coordination 
equilibrium, b) Nash equilibrium and c) Stackelberg equilibrium. The reaction function 
depends on the output of the two economies, inflation, exchange rate shock, lagged 
exchange rate and a reaction rule that takes into account the other country inflation. The 
optimal rules were found using a linear quadratic model. Several simulations were 
performed in order to calculate the variances on the inflation, output and interest rates 
when economies are under demand, cost and/or exchange shocks.  
The dynamic model shows us that the output and inflation stabilization is more efficient 
when the coordination rule is used. The greater is the welfare gains the more dependent 
and open the country is. If macro coordination is impossible, the country that has more 
relevant information assumes a leader position, getting welfare gains in terms of 
inflation and output volatilities.  
Without coordination, monetary rules with more weight on inflation turned out to get 
less stabilization on inflation and output than other policies rules. Hence, the more 
dependent and open is the country, the less weight should be placed on inflation, to 
avoid an increase in the output and inflation volatilities. The relevance of this kind of 
model that allows the interaction of two economies is increasing lately, as we move to a 
more global and integrated world. 
After this introduction, in section 2 we deal with the two-country model specification. 
In section 3 we compare the optimal monetary policy rule for the three types of already 
mentioned equilibria. Section 4 presents the simulation results and in section 5 a few 
paragraphs summarize the main conclusions.    7
2.  Two-Country Model 
The core of the two-country model used in this paper is based in Ball (1998), adding up 
the externalities of the other economy output. The model has five equations: the 
domestic and foreign country demand, the domestic and foreign supply and the fifth 
equation that connects both economies by the exchange rate. The model specification is:   
t t t t t t u y a y a r a a y + + + − = − − − −
*
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where  t y  is the log of the output gap (real output minus the potential one), r is the real 
interest rate, ρ is the real exchange rate – an increase means real depreciation in the 
domestic economy – π is the inflation rate, u is the demand shock, e is the cost-push 
shock and v is the exchange rate shock;  i a  e  i b  are the structural parameters of the 
economy. The asterisks mean external variables and parameters. All the shocks are 
white noise, meaning zero mean and constant variance. 
The model is linear around the steady state values. Inflation, real interest rate, and 
exchange rate are considered zero in the steady state. 
 
Phillips Curves 
Equations (3) and (4) present the Phillips curves. Each one relates inflation with its 
lagged value, lagged output gap, changes in the exchange rate and the contemporaneous 
cost shock. A change in the exchange rate affects inflation due to imported prices. The 
equation merges the imported and domestic inflation.  
The specification for the domestic inflation is similar to a Phillips curve for a closed 
economy as shown by equation 6.   8
'
1 1 t t t
d
t e by + + = − − π π           ( 6 )  
Imported inflation is given by the total inflation of the previous period added to a 
proportion of the lagged output gap. Imported prices follow a purchase power parity, so 
this inflation is given by: 
) ( 2 1 1 − − − − + = t t t
i
t ρ ρ π π          ( 7 )  
where imported inflation is a result of the total inflation of the last period plus any 
change in the exchange rate in the last period. On the other hand, inflation in the present 
period, given by equation (3), is a weighted average of domestic inflation and imported 
one, taking the share of imported goods as φ. The following identities hold: 
b b ) 1 ( 1 φ − = ,  φ = 2 b  e 
' ) 1 ( t t e e φ − = . 
 
Real Exchange Rate 
Equation (5) connects the two economies by the real exchange rate, which relates it to 
the interest rate differential. This relationship captures the financial market behavior: an 
increase in the real interest rate turns the domestic asset more attractive and so causes 
exchange rate appreciation. Other things that affect the exchange rate are the shocks in 
the exchange rate, which capture the expectations and the confidence of the private 
agents. Equation (5) can be obtained by a linear approximation of the balance of 
payments equilibrium equation.  
The balance of payments equation has the current account expression (TC) and the 
capital equations (MCA). The current account is positively related to the real exchange 
rate and the capital equation is positively related to the real interest rate differential. 
Hence: 
0 ) ( ) ( 1
* = − + − + + t t t t t t E r r MCA TC ρ ρ ρ        ( 8 )  
The linear approximation of the equation (8) brings us to the equation (5), less the 
exchange rate shock. In the absence of the bubbles and under rational expectations give 
us that  0 1 = + t t E ρ .   9
There are other theories about the exchange rate behavior. Some of them are focused on 
variables as wealth and debt.  Others consider purchase power parity and uncovered 
interest parity. Our paper emphasizes the role of the trade balance and of the interest 
rate differential and no attention to the role of wealth and debt stocks. 
 
Parameters of the model 
The calibration was based on results found in the literature
1. Some parameters are set to 
capture the difference in the degree of openness and in the relative size of the 
economies. 
Table 1 presents the results of the calibration for an open economy. Ball (1998) shows 
the results for the American economy; Haldane & Batini (1999) for the UK; Bonomo & 
Brito (2001) and Freitas & Muinhos (2001) for Brazil. Walsh (1998, p. 472) uses data 
based on other author's papers and with the exception of this work and Ball (1998) all 
the others results are for quarterly models. 
Table 1. Parameters of the Structural Model 
  Ball (1998)  H&B (1998)  B&B (2001) F&M  (2001) Walsh  (1998)
3 a   0.8  0.8  0.91 0.73 0.8 
2 a   0.6  0.5  0.51 0.39 0.35 
1 a   0.2 0.2 0.08  -  0.04 
1 b   0.4  0.4  0.32 0.31 - 
2 b   0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 
 
where:  
1 a : demand elasticity for the exchange rate 
2 a : demand elasticity for the real interest rate 
                                                 
1 Our purpose here is not the estimation of the parameters of the structural model for a particular 
economy, but to calibrate them to find a stylized model in order to simulate different policy objectives.   10
3 a : auto-regressive parameter 
1 b : inflation elasticity in relation to the demand 
2 b : inflation elasticity in relation to the exchange (passthrough) 
Comparing all the parameters used in the small-scale structural model, Table 1 points 
out the consistency in the magnitude and the sign of the parameters used by those 
authors.  The IS curve and the Phillips curve in the models by Ball (1998) and by Freitas 
& Muinhos (2001) are backward-looking. Haldane & Batini (1998) model has a 
backward looking IS curve and the Phillips curve is a weighted average of backward-
looking and forward-looking terms with a small weight in the last term. The exchange 
rate parameter in the IS curve and in the Phillips curve from Bonomo & Brito (2001) is 
rather small, showing how closed is the Brazilian economy compared with the US and 
the UK.  
Table 2 shows the parameters used in the simulations that are based on those presented 
in Table 1. 
Table 2. Parameters for the Two Economies 
Domestic Foreign 
1 . 0 1 = a   2 . 0
*
1 = a  
45 . 0
*
2 2 = = a a  45 . 0
*
2 2 = = a a  
8 . 0
*
3 3 = = a a   8 . 0
*
3 3 = = a a  
1 . 0 4 = a   2 . 0
*
4 = a  
3 . 0 1 = b   4 . 0
*
1 = b  
2 . 0 2 = b   4 . 0
*
2 = b  
 
Those parameters are meant to represent two stylized facts: that the domestic economy 
is more closed, with a smaller pass through from exchange rate to inflation, 
*
2 2 b b < ; and 
it is less dependent on the foreign country’s output, meaning that the demand of the 
other economy will affect less the domestic economy than vice-versa, 
*
4 4 a a < .  
   11
3. Optimal Equilibrium Rule 
In this section we present some details about how to obtain the optimal equilibrium rule. 
Except for some particular dynamic equations, most of them do not have algebraic 
solutions and they need iterated computer algorithm to solve. Svensson (1997) presents 
a particular dynamic equation with an algebraic solution.  
In the optimal dynamic solution of the two-country model we use the algorithm of linear 
quadratic method. This method is extensively used in Real Business Cycle Theory 
(RBC), where the return function is maximized. In our case, it is a loss function, which 
is minimized. 
The linear quadratic algorithm is based on Díaz-Giménez (1999) and it is implemented 
on computer language Matlab 5.1. In subsection below, we give details on how we 
implemented the algorithm to obtain three types of solutions: macroeconomic 
coordination equilibrium, Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. 
3.1 Macroeconomic Coordination Equilibrium  
Two countries obtain macroeconomic coordination when they minimize a joint 
objective function with same weight on the output gap, under the control of their 
respective monetary instruments, r and r
*. That is: 
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Each restriction equation can be separated in three parts: i) state variables at time t; ii) 
control variables at time t and iii) shocks at time t + 1. Defining the state variables by si, 
where i = 1, 2, 3 or 4. Then:  
*
4 3 1 1 t t t t y a y a a s + + = ν  
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The value function of macroeconomic coordination in dynamic programming format is: 
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i s  is next period state variable for  1 = i , 2, 3 or 4.   13
The return function is: 
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The optimal monetary policy rules with coordination are obtained by simulation using 
expressions (15) to (17) with parameters given by Table 2. These rules are function of 
six arguments  ) , , , , , ( 1
* * ν ρ π π − y y f  as shown by expressions below. The coefficients of 
these arguments are taken for the specific case with  1 = λ , the weight attributed to the 
output gap in the loss function. Therefore: 
1
* * 1580 . 0 1843 . 0 2063 . 0 2027 . 1 6806 . 0 6005 . 1 − − + + + + = t t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π π    (18) 
1
* * * 1793 . 0 2860 . 0 8072 . 0 7177 . 0 2225 . 1 1734 . 1 − + − + + + = t t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π π    (19) 
The signals of the coefficients of above reactions functions are all coherent with the 
literature. The interest rate reacts positively to the output gap and inflation rate to both 
economies. 
We generate many samples for output, inflation and interest rate under optimal rules and 
taking into account the demand, the supply and the exchange rate shocks. After that, the 
variances of inflation and output were calculated. The variances obtained with different 
values of weight (given to output gap in the loss function) are plotted on a single graph 
showing the trade-off between the inflation rate and output variances. 
3.2 Nash  Equilibrium 
The Nash equilibrium is a non-coordinated policy. The authorities choose interest rate 
to minimize a loss function, taking as given the interest rate of the other country. Each 
country decides their policy, taking into account that the other nation has already 
decided and would not change it during this period. The Nash equilibrium treatment in 
this section is similar to that is taken by Walsh (1998, p.266). The home country loss 
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The equilibrium treatment is similar to both countries. Then, we take home country to 
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1
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Following the same treatment given to coordinated solution, each restriction equation 
can be separated in three parts: i) state variables at time t; ii) control variables at time t 
and iii) shock at time t + 1. The two state variables  1 s  and  3 s  are defined as:  
*
4 3 1 1 t t t t y a y a a s + + = ν          ( 2 4 )  
t t t t t b b y b s ν ρ π 2 1 2 1 3 + − + = −        ( 2 5 )  
The value function of Nash equilibrium in dynamic programming format is: 
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where  2 1 a a c + = θ  and 
'
i s  is next period state variable for  1 = i  or 3.   15
The optimal monetary policy rules to home country, r, is a function of five arguments 
) , , , , ( 1
* ν ρ π − y y f  while foreign country has  ) , , , , ( 1
* * ν ρ π − y y f  as its rule, 
* r . The 
coefficients of these arguments are taken for the specific case with  1 = λ , the weight 
attributed to the output gap in the loss function. Therefore: 
1
* 22434 . 0 34305 . 0 1217 . 1 11871 . 0 28619 . 1 − − + + + = t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π     (27) 
1
* * * 28764 . 0 38178 . 0 7191 . 0 09414 . 0 6642 . 0 − + − + + = t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π     (28) 
The graphic of trade-off between the inflation rate variance and output variance is 
obtained in similar way as coordinated equilibrium. 
3.3 Stackelberg  Equilibrium   
Stackelberg equilibrium, also known as leader-follower equilibrium, is another example 
of uncoordinated policy. The authorities choose the interest rate to minimize the loss 
function, taking into account how the other policy authority will respond to the leader's 
choice of interest rate. We take home country as leader. The external reaction function 
is given by Nash equilibrium,  t t t s j s j r 4 2 2 1
* + = , where  1 j  and  2 j  are the coefficients 
that depend on weight attributed to output gap variance in loss function. 
The value function of Stackelberg equilibrium in dynamic programming format is: 
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* a a c + = θ  and 
'
i s  is next period state variable for  1 = i , 2, 3 or 4.   16
The optimal monetary policy rules to home country, r, is a function of six arguments 
) , , , , , ( 1
* * ν ρ π π − y y f  while to foreign country has  ) , , , , ( 1
* * ν ρ π − y y f  as its rule, 
* r . 
The coefficients of these arguments are taken for the specific case with  1 = λ , the 
weight attributed to the output gap variance in the loss function. Thus: 
1
* * 0996 . 0 1744 . 0 3029 . 0 1036 . 1 4272 . 0 3458 . 1 − − + + + + = t t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π π    (30) 
1
* * * 2876 . 0 3817 . 0 7191 . 0 6638 . 0 0940 . 0 − + − + + = t t t t t t y y r ρ ν π     (31) 
The leader reaction function has the output gap and inflation rate of foreign country as 
its arguments while the follower takes only leader's output gap on its optimal reaction 
function. 
The graphic of trade-off between the inflation rate and output gap variances is obtained 
in similar way as before.  
 
4. Simulation Results 
Volatilities of inflation and output are used to measure the performance of different 
monetary policy rules following Taylor (1999), Ball (1998), Svensson (1998). The 
policy rule that conducts to less inflation and output volatilities is considered the best 
one.  
We ran some simulations to obtain the inflation rate, the output gap and the interest rate 
volatilities as shown in Table 3. Each optimal rule is obtained with parameter values 
given by Table 2 and taking the same weight attributed to the inflation rate and output 
gap in the loss function. To obtain the variances, we consider demand, cost-pushing and 
exchange rate shocks. All shocks are white noise.   17
Table 3. Volatilities of Inflation rate, Output Gap and Interest rate 
  Home country  Foreign country 




Coordination    3.11 2.57 4.71 2.39  2.46  4.38 
Nash    3.25 2.86 3.61 4.43  4.27  2.40 
Leader  (home)  2.98 2.76 3.98 4.46  4.90  2.61 
Leader  (foreign)  3.11 3.02 3.72 2.51  2.59  3.80 
 
Table 3 shows that under macroeconomic coordination policy, both countries have less 
inflation and output gap volatilities than any other type of policy. Nash equilibrium has 
clearly worse inflation and output gap volatilities than other rules for both countries. But 
comparing Nash equilibrium with Stackelberg equilibrium one can see that the leader 
has better performance. We found 2.98 for inflation volatility and 2.76 for output 
volatility when the home country is the leader; clearly those values are lesser than 3.25 
and 2.86 under Nash equilibrium.  
Taylor (1999) brings us a remark about volatility of policy instrument in his robustness 
analyses of different monetary policy rules. Table 3 shows that the volatility of interest 
rate is higher in the case of coordination equilibrium. The less volatilities of output gap 
and inflation rate under coordination come from an aggressive policy response to the 
shocks. Briefly, the coordination equilibrium conducts to less inflation and output 
volatilities but higher interest rate and exchange rate volatilities. 
In short, our two-country inflation target dynamic framework found that 
macroeconomic coordination is desirable. Figure 1 below confirms this fact. We can get 
the same result simulating different combinations of shocks. This result is in line with 
the static models of Canzoneri & Gray (1985), Fielding & Mizen (1996), Walsh (1998, 
p. 259). 
The next two figures show the trade-off of home and foreign countries under optimal 
rules.   18
Figure 1. Trade-off of Efficient Frontier for Home Country 
 
Figure 2. Trade-off of Efficient Frontier for Foreign Country 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the efficient frontier − lesser volatilities for inflation and output 
gap. Each simulation is divided in two steps: i) optimal rules of home and foreign 
countries are obtained from each type of equilibrium and; ii) using these rules and 
considering all types of shocks we generate the first and the second moments of the 
relevant variables.   19
The figures also show that when we assign more weight to inflation in the objective 
function we obtain an increase of the inflation and output volatilities
2 (except in the 
coordination case). Under macroeconomic coordination rule both countries have a 
common objective function and the trade-off between output and inflation volatilities is 
still working independent of the weight of the objective function.  
Our two-country model’s equations point out that the stabilization of output gap and 
inflation rate occurs through three channels: the interest rate, the exchange rate and 
foreign output. Except for the coordination case, the lower weight in output (meaning 
higher commitment with lower inflation) conducts to greater volatilities of inflation and 
output. On the other hand, higher output gap stabilization does not result in inflation rate 
destabilization.  
Under Nash equilibrium rule, as we assign more weight on inflation stabilization in the 
loss function, we obtain higher volatility in inflation and output especially in the foreign 
country, which is parameterized with a greater degree of openness and as a more 
dependent economy.  For this type of country it is not recommended a strict inflation 
goal but a flexible target. 
The optimal rules coefficients depend on the structural parameters of the model and the 
weight given to output gap in the loss function. We point out two structural parameters: 
the degree of openness and relative size of the country. The simulation takes the 
parameters as given in Table 2. Needless to say, 
*
4 4 a a <  characterizes that the home 
country is less dependent than the foreign country and 
*
2 2 b b <  means that domestic 
country is less open compared to foreign country. 
Another simulation is shown in Table 5 using a greater difference on the degree of 
openness and relative size of two countries
3. Table 4 shows the coefficients using 
original parameters. The coefficients of new simulation are consistent with the signals 
and magnitudes of the previous one.   
 
                                                 
2 This figure is done changing the parameter value λ in [0, + ∞). If  λ < 1 then we assign more weight on 
inflation. If λ > 1, it means more weight on output stabilization.   
3  This simulation is done increasing the difference on the parameters, (
*
4 4 a a < ,). It means that the home 
country is bigger than before and the foreign country is smaller than before. If the difference of 
*
2 2 b b <  
increases,  it means a “smaller” degree of openness of the home country and “greater” degree of openness 
of the  foreign country.   20
Table 4. Nash Equilibrium with  2 . 0 1 . 0
*
4 4 = < = a a  and  4 . 0 2 . 0
*
2 2 = < = b b . 
 y  y
*  π  π
*  ν  1 − ρ  
r  1.28619 0.11871 1.1217  0  0.34305 -0.22434 
r
*  0.09414  0.6642 0  0.7191 -0.38178  0.28764 
 
Table 5. Nash Equilibrium with  3 . 0 05 . 0
*
4 4 = < = a a  and  5 . 0 1 . 0
*
2 2 = < = b b . 
 y  y
*  π  π
*  ν  1 − ρ  
r 1.51657  0.071425  1.2459  0 0.26744  -0.12459 
r
* 0.11538  0.57524  0 0.6689  -0.41137  0.33445 
 
The closer is the economy (home country in our example) less important is the other 
country’s variables, the exchange rate shock, and lagged exchange rate variables on r. 
This means that the greater is the degree of openness and dependence of the other 
economy (foreign country in our case) the smaller is the monetary policy reaction 
through the interest rate (r*), in response to the inflation rate and the output gap. We 
obtain the same results with other types of optimal rules. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Summing up, we can point to the following main conclusions: 
-  The macro coordination equilibrium brings about less volatile output and inflation 
than Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium; 
-  the stabilization of output and inflation are greater for more dependent and more 
open economy; 
-  the country which has more information and adopts a leader position presents a more 
stable economy; 
-  in the absence of coordination, a more strict anti-inflation policy results in a greater 
output volatility, being worse in a more dependent and open economy;   21
-  a more dependent and open economy responds more aggressively to a exchange rate 
shock.  
In the two-country model, it was possible to illustrate some stylized facts and derive 
some conclusions about different aspects of the monetary policy. However it is worth to 
stress that some important aspects such as fiscal policy and the structural features of the 
economy are not taken into account in this paper. So it is necessary to treat with caution 
our simulation results for guidance to monetary policy. We believe that our dynamic 
framework dealing with interacting economies is a starting point for a promising 
research agenda. 
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